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this paper explores changes in Industrial Relations (IR) regulation and 
practice in a context of institutional crisis and change. the existing literature 
on industrial relations in Greece highlights a long process of deregulation 
that has been accelerated since the onset of the economic crisis, and the 
inherent segmentation of the Greek system between regulated players and 
largely unregulated informal and SMe players.  Radical neo-liberal reforms 
have weakened the position of those most reliant on traditional regulatory 
arrangements: larger formal sector employers and their workers, making 
the basis of Greek competitiveness more fragile. At the same time, the 
system cannot be dismissed as simply dysfunctional: key elite interests have 
done well from weak and uneven institutional coverage and have much 
to gain by reduced government capabilities. At the time of writing, the 
Greek IR system is being impelled in one direction by external pressures 
and elite interests, and another by a grassroots counter-movement; whilst 
the solutions to the Greek condition may be political, the realm of political 
action is circumscribed by long historical legacies. 
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introduction
There has been a growing body of work on IR in Greece, which has highlighted 
the nature and extent of structural crisis and systemic liberalization (Kornelakis 
and Voskeristian, 2014; Zambarloukou, 2010). A common strand running through 
such work is that Greece has undergone shifts towards lighted regulation, but 
without the complementarities normally associated with mature Liberal Market 
Economies (LMEs, ibid.). In contrast, based on the most recent developments 
in Greece, and ongoing advances in the theoretical literature on comparative 
capitalism, we highlight not only institutional changes, but also long continuities, 
continuities that set Greece apart from both ‘disorganized’ LMEs and other Mixed 
Market Economies (MMEs), making for an industrial relations system with some 
quite distinct features. 
It can be argued that in examining issues of institutional change and labour 
market regulation, there has been a tendency to either neglect politics, or assume 
that the hollowing out of politics is a foregone conclusion, making liberalization 
inevitable (c.f. Streeck, 2011); in contrast, the accession to power of Syriza would 
indicate that political counter-movements may indeed make real advances, even if 
durable compromises or solutions remain elusive. Once more, as recent advances in 
elite theory alert us, when military elites are able to secure a persistent influence in 
national life, socio-economic realities will differ from other countries with broadly 
similar institutional arrangements in other respects (Priestland, 2012). Hence, this 
paper highlights the limitations of conceptualizations of the role of the state that 
simply depict it as retreating or struggling to manage markets; it draws out the 
consequences of excessive and partially concealed defence spending for other 
areas of the economy, and, by extension, for work and employment relations. 
This is a feature that sets Greece apart from MMEs, but has relevance for other 
national contexts where military ambitions outstrip economic capabilities, and 
where relations with the military have been quite effective in accessing resources, 
austerity elsewhere notwithstanding. In other words, unlike other MMEs, in 
Greece the sovereign debt crisis was not only due to the state shouldering the 
debts run up by an irresponsible banking sector, but owing to over-borrowing to 
support unsustainable levels of defence spending. Not only is the latter likely to 
crowd out investment in other areas of the economy (Scott, 2001; Kollias and 
Paleologou, 2010), but it also made the crisis, and the scale and depth of current 
reforms, particularly severe. Again, due to long historical legacies, key economic 
elites have only selectively engaged with the national system (Close, 2014). Due 
to the extreme fluidity of the situation being faced in Greece at this time and the 
particularly ‘quick’ outdating of information, this research focuses on publically 
available information, complemented by recent theoretical advances within the 
broad literature on comparative capitalism and elite theory. 
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Varieties of capitalism and the Greek ‘mixed market’ 
capitalism
The original Varieties of Capitalism (VoC) approach (Hall and Soskice, 2001) 
divides developed countries into Liberal (LME, e.g. US and UK) and Coordinated 
Market Economies (CME, e.g. Scandinavia, Germany, Japan). Hall and Soskice 
(2001) held that other capitalist archetypes lacked the known complementarities 
encountered in them, and hence would ultimately converge in the direction of 
one or the other. Later work conceded that convergence was neither a smooth 
nor inevitable process and that other societies had distinct and persistent institu-
tional features (and, indeed, pockets of advantage) in their own right (Amable, 
2003; Hancké et al., 2007).
More recent developments and extensions of the VoC approach developed 
further archetypes. Hall and Thelen (2006) suggest that the economies found in 
Southern Europe, constitute an archetype in their own right, the “mixed market 
economies” (MMEs), which include Spain, Portugal, Italy and Greece. These 
economies show a “mixed market regulation with a degree of coordinated, 
relational arrangements” (Nash, 2011: 230). In other words, they have been 
classified as being in-between two mature archetypes of the VoC model (Hancké 
et al., 2007). The term MME is not an unproblematic one in that CMEs also 
combine elements of state and market.  Nonetheless, this is a term that has 
gained some currency, and hence is one deployed through this article. 
In a recent Relations industrielles/Industrial Relations paper, Kornelakis and 
Voskeritsan (2014: 344) argued that reforms would “transform Greece into a 
dysfunctional market economy.” The political backlash against the reforms, and 
the accession to power of Syriza in 2015, have highlighted the extent to which 
top-down reforms may be halted or even reversed, and the essential dynamism 
and volatility of the Greek system jeopardized. At the same time, Kornelakis and 
Voskeritsan (2014) focused on the formal mechanisms of regulation and policy 
reforms up until 2011; they acknowledge, however, that a key feature of Greece 
is not so much the regulatory reforms, but how there can be a persistent disarti-
culation between regulatory features and actual firm level practices. This would 
suggest that formal regulatory reforms may, in reality, have a very uneven impact 
on actual firm behaviour, especially SMEs and underground economies. Hence, 
a primary focus of this article is on the inherent and persistent segmentation of 
the Greek economy—and on changes since 2011 up until the acceptance of the 
third bailout terms following the 2015 referendum—complementing this earlier 
detailed study of changes of regulatory features.
MMEs are characterized by a large agricultural sector, long history of state 
intervention and relatively deregulated IR (c.f. Hall and Soskice, 2001: 21). 
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In addition, MMEs are not based on skill intensity but rather on their ability to 
meet changes in market demands (Amable, 2003). As in other Mediterranean 
countries, Greece relies heavily on regulation (Casey, 2009) and the state plays a 
predominant role in various aspects of the national economic development such 
as the relationships between firms, the relationships between firms and financial 
capital and the determination of industrial relations outcomes, education, 
etc. (Schmidt, 2002; Zambarloukou, 2006; Fotopoulou, 2014). According to 
Zambarloukou (2010), another feature of Greece is the inefficient coordination 
within the economy and labour market which is mainly related to the large 
number of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Similarly with other MMEs, 
like Spain and Italy, Greece appears to have a misfit between labour institutions 
and lack of institutional complementarities (c.f. Molina and Rhodes, 2007: 225-
226). In other words, in MMEs, there is a history of the state playing an extensive 
regulatory role; there is also a lack of developed institutional complementarities, 
especially in relation to welfare and educational provisions (Hancké et al., 2007; 
Amable, 2003; Hall and Soskice, 2001). The limited welfare provision increases the 
need for attachment to job security (Featherstone, 2008). In MMEs, a unionized 
employee voice is strongly reliant upon the provisions of a legislative framework 
(see Regalia, 1995; c.f. Marginson and Sisson, 2006). Hence “[…] legal enactment 
has been prior and collective bargaining secondary, reflecting the pervasive role of 
the state in economic and social affairs […]” (Marginson and Sisson, 2006: 43).
Whilst the MME categorization is a very broad one, there is little doubt that 
the Greek economy has all these features, albeit sometimes in an exaggerated 
form (c.f. Psychogios et al., 2010; Psychogios and Wood, 2010). This has led 
some writers to suggest that it is somewhat hard to categorize economies such 
as Greece that appear to be shifting towards a “defamiliarized” and more liberal 
model (Kornelakis and Voskeritsan, 2014). This argument is also supported by 
recent work in the comparative institutional tradition that has highlighted the 
extent to which institutions are not always as closely coupled as commonly 
presumed (Lane and Wood, 2009) nor is the coverage of national institutions 
necessarily complete (ibid.). In this respect, within any national context, there 
are areas of economic activity and social groupings that may become decoupled 
from dominant ways of doing things nationally. There are two forms of such 
decoupling which may be assumed.
The first is that whilst there is an inevitable clustering of institutions at the 
national level, regional and sectoral institutions may make for alternative sets of 
complementarities (ibid.). A cluster of firms—or even, a single large firm—may 
create alternative sets of local institutions (Crouch et al., 2009: 672). Firms may 
opt away from the dominant national paradigm, orientating themselves towards 
regional or sectoral specific structures (ibid.). Such a process may be aimed at 
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either compensating for national systemic “pathologies” or an attempt to build 
on regional strengths (Sorge, 2005: 245).
A second process is institutional drift, whereby regions or social groupings 
become partially decoupled not so much as a conscious remedy for institutional 
failings at the national level, but because dominant interests gradually marginalize 
or discard those interests and groupings that are seen irrelevant to their own 
accumulation (Jessop, 2012). In turn, players may seek to at least partially exit from 
the system because the burdens imposed (i.e., the taxes or formal employment 
regulation) appear greater than the benefits of participation. 
From a social system of production starting point, Amable (2003) argues that 
what he terms as the Mediterranean model is neither temporary nor transitional, 
but may persist and evolve on distinct lines. Such countries have some advantages 
in labour intensive industries sensitive to wage costs, such as textiles and rubber 
products (Amable, 2003: 205; c.f. Kyrgidou and Spyropoulou, 2013); whilst 
many emerging markets may have even lower costs, they lack the market access 
Mediterranean enjoy as members of the EU. Whilst the hands-off employment 
policies, and low investment in vocational training, that characterize them is 
rather akin to LMEs (Amable, 2003: 140), in Mediterranean economies, this is 
combined with more regulated product markets, a tradition of higher levels of 
state command and control regulation, and with their associated administrative 
and regulatory burdens (Amable, 2003: 120).
Schmidt (2002) provides an alternative—but broadly similar typology—that 
of ‘State-influenced Market Economies’ (Schmidt, 2007), which, devotes more 
attention to industrial relations issues. In State-influenced Market Economies, 
inter-firm and employment relationships are characterized by high levels of state 
mediation, but also adversarialism as was the case in Greece, at least until the 
onset of the 2008 crisis (Featherstone, 2008). Jessop (2012) argues that, whilst 
national specificities persist, at particular moments, a set of ideologies and 
practices may attain eco-systemic dominance; currently, this is neo-liberalism, 
and hence, any changes in the Greek system in response to crisis are likely to be 
in this direction. 
Featherstone (2011) argues that successive Greek governments had failed 
to deal with structural problems of competitiveness, and gross imbalances in 
both investment and trade, making the economy highly vulnerable to external 
shocks. The 2008 economic crisis resulted in the country being placed under an 
unprecedented degree of “external monitoring and policing” by the International 
Financial Institutions and the EU (Featherstone, 2011: 193) arguably on a more 
thorough level than other crisis-ridden EU states. In turn, the imposition of these 
measures raise questions of state legitimacy and governability which may have 
unforeseen future consequences (Featherstone, 2011). 
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elite composition and the Greek crisis
Indeed, the scale of the crisis, which was even worse than those suffered by 
Spain, Portugal and Ireland might suggest that Greece is a rather extreme case. 
On the one hand, it could be argued that Greece’s large underground economy 
and institutional complexities suggest that it has more in common with the tran-
sitional economies of the Balkan countries than more developed Mediterranean 
economies (Antonopoulos, 2008; Psychogios and Szamosi, 2007). On the other 
hand, Greece is distinct from both other MMEs and the other Balkan states by 
the structural nature of its crisis. One of the most remarkable aspects of the 
present condition has been the haste with which the blame for banking sector 
misconduct has been glibly shifted onto the state: crises which, in Ireland, Spain 
and Italy, started in the banking sector have been swiftly and carelessly labelled 
as sovereign wealth crises, despite the fact that the latter were commonly caused 
by hasty bank bailouts. In contrast, and uniquely, the Greek crisis is, to a large 
extent, a genuine sovereign wealth one.
As Dunne et al. (2001) note, for many years, owing to antipathy to Turkey, 
Greece has borne extraordinarily high levels of defence spending; easy credit 
was extended by West European banks at the prompting of their governments 
in order to bolster their domestic arms industries. Such spending was very much 
higher as a proportion of GDP than other NATO and EU states; at the end of the 
Cold War, most countries cut back on arms spending, but in the case of Greece 
it actually increased leading, in turn, to extremely high levels of government debt 
(Kollias et al., 2004). According to World Bank (2014) data, prior to 2008 Greece 
was spending 2.7% of GDP on military spending which increased to 3.0% and 
3.2% in 2008-2009 respectively; in 2012 and 2013 these were 2.4% and 2.5% 
respectively. In contrast, Italy and Spain have maintained 2% and 1% respectively 
for the last 10 years while Italy has dropped from 1.8% to about 1.5% of GDP.
As Lynn (2010: 118) notes, a large amount of such debt was “systematically 
concealed in the interests of national security”; this ‘fiddle’ meant that Greece’s 
debt situation was very much worse than initially anticipated, making for 
particularly painful adjustments. Moreover, an excessive investment on defence 
has crowded out investment in other areas, worsening structural distortions in 
the Greek economy, and, thus, indirectly contributed to the unbalanced nature 
of the labour market (c.f. Kollias and Paleologou, 2010). The partially concealed 
nature of defence spending has further created ample opportunities for corruption, 
which may spill over into other areas of the economy; there is much evidence 
that high military spending worsens corruption (Gupta et al., 2001). Ironically, 
despite it having helped cause the Greek crisis, spending on the Greek military 
has not been curtailed to the same extent as other areas of the public sector 
(Drakoularakos, 2014); indeed, defence spending on equipment remains opaque 
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(Dempsey, 2013), providing a fertile avenue for corruption, and degrading 
economic life at large. Priestland (2012) argues that elites are typically composed 
of three factions: militarists; merchant/capitalists; and savants. Only when the 
former two are discredited do the latter attain predominance, and enact policies 
that entail genuine social compromises. Whilst there is little doubt that capitalist 
elites and the solutions they have promulgated are now largely discredited with 
a large component of the Greek electorate, the militarists retain considerable 
political influence and clout, whilst weaker governmental regulatory capabilities 
make it harder to reign in less responsible economic interests.
the role of enterprises in the Greek ir system
In common with other MMEs, there is a pronounced dualism of labour 
markets and welfare institutions (Zambarloukou, 2010), where a large number 
of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)1 exist (i.e., in the Greek case nearly two-
thirds of total employment (c.f. Mulhern, 1995 and Kritsantonis, 1998). Most 
firms are family owned and managed by their founders or by small proprietors 
(Galanaki and Papalexandris, 2005; Mihail and Elefterie, 2006; Vouzas, 2004) 
and the ownership structure allows for the concentration of power and control 
within a few large holders (Vasiliou and Daskalakis, 2009). According to Amable 
(2003), in contrast with the Continental European model which emphasizes 
social protection, the Mediterranean model is based on employment protection. 
Nevertheless, employment protection legislation is in formal terms one of the 
strictest across the OECD countries (OECD 2007, 2008 and 2009; c.f. Kretsos, 
2011a: 458 and 2011b: 265), enforcement is generally inconsistent, incoherent 
and ineffective (Mihail, 2003; Psychogios et al., 2010; Psychogios and Wood, 
2010; Zambarloukou, 2007 and 2010). Indeed, the violation of labour law is 
considered an ‘endemic phenomenon’ for the majority of enterprises in the private 
services sector (Kretsos, 2004; c.f. Kretsos, 2011b: 276). Where unions are absent, 
rights are particularly weak (Zambarloukou, 2007 and 2010) and in particular 
for SMEs (Mihail, 2004: 550). In any event, firms with less than 20 employees 
(97% of Greek firms) are not obliged to recognize unions representative of their 
workforce (Kouzis, 2007; Kretsos, 2011b; Matsaganis, 2007). Indeed, it has been 
argued that worker rights are more precarious in Greece than in other MMEs 
(Mihail, 2003; c.f. Psychogios and Wood, 2010).
It is widely noted that many Greek SMEs hire and pay employees in the form 
of undeclared work (Kretsos, 2004; Kouzis, 2009), evade taxation (Kapsalis, 
2007; Kouzis, 2007; Psychogios and Wood, 2010), and generally ignore labour 
law legislations (Mihail, 2004), even if they are formally constituted enterprises. 
In contrast, large enterprises are highly regulated, and heavily unionized and 
since the onset of the crisis, many have engaged in large-scale job shedding 
rethinkinG Greek Capitalism throuGh the lens of industrial relations reform: a vieW until the 2015 referendum 705  
 
(Hyman, 2010). After the agreement to the last bailout, the present Greek left 
government “committed” to 50€ billion in the sale or winding down of state 
owned assets (The Guardian, 2015; Reuters, 2015). This means that the more 
regulated component of the Greek economy (bar the military complex and al-
lied firms) is likely to shrink with the unregulated component assuming greater 
importance.
towards the Liberalization of industrial relations
Labour Market Deregulation
In 2010 in collaboration with the European Union (EU), the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) signed the Memorandum of Economic and Fiscal Policies 
(MoF-Law 3845/2010a,b), starting a process of labour market deregulation, since 
the structure of the Greek labour market was the major barrier for growth of the 
Greek economy (Koukiadaki and Kretsos, 2012). In this respect, the target was 
a drastic reduction of labour costs and deregulation and liberalization. Various 
significant aspects of Greek labour law have been revised with major consequences 
both for the role of the state and the actors of the IR system (Koukiadaki and 
Kretsos, 2012). The labour law reform has been designed to address both the 
results of the international financial crisis and Greece’s own fiscal problems. In 
addition, the austerity measures of previous Greek governments, as imposed by 
the IMF and EU, have instituted significant and dramatic changes in employment 
policy. More specifically, 
[…]the measures proclaimed by the initial and consequent bailout agreements stipu-
lated among others wage cuts, pay freezes, massive dismissals in the public sector, 
restructuring of public enterprises, lower minimum wages for young workers and in-
crease in retirement age […] (Kretsos, 2011b: 268). 
The new employment relations challenge the coverage of existing collective 
agreements. The reforms seek to promote the decentralization of collective 
bargaining (Kretsos, 2011b: 268). Collective agreements were substituted 
with individual or firm-specific contracts (Law 4024/2012). At the same time, 
the structural program adopted in February 2012 (Law 4046/2012) replaced 
the possibility of indefinite collective agreements between 1 and 3 years 
(Dedoussopoulos et al., 2013). Moreover, the law on redundancies became less 
strict by lowering the level of severance pay and by giving the opportunity to 
employers to give half of the severance pay to employees so long as they provided a 
written warning a few months earlier (ranging from two to six months depending 
on the number of working years with the current employer). The minimum wage 
experienced a 22% cut for employees over 25 years of age and 32% for those 
under 25 (Matsaganis, 2012). Finally, there was a suspension of bonuses from 
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public sector employees and wage freezes (European Commission, 2015). These 
reforms mostly affected those with “good” jobs at larger organizations: non-
unionized employees are not practically covered by any sort of union-based 
collective agreement (Kokkaliari, 2010a; Kretsos, 2011b).
Working conditions
The employment laws (e.g., 3845/2010, 3863/2010, 4039/2012 and 4152/2012) 
also changed the regulation of working time, moving away from the standard 
level of eight hours hitherto promoted. Additional remuneration rates for over-
time have also been cut. The working week has been extended from five to six 
days for private and public workers, without an additional wage increase, job cuts 
seem to have also led to work intensification with longer hours in many services 
for remaining public sector employees while overtime rates have been reduced 
(European Commission, 2015). It is a widespread view amongst trade union offi-
cials that the new legislative context allows “the employers to unilaterally define 
and adjust the number of working hours” (Kokkaliari, 2010a: 34). It also became 
easier for employers to make use of temporary or part-time workers, whilst the 
provisional period of a probationary employment was extended.
the Changing Role of Mediation and Arbitration 
One of the most critical and challenging issues is the future role of the OMED. 
As has been noted in the past, it played a significant role in advancing worker 
rights. Its reputation as being ‘worker friendly’ has been diluted under the new 
law (i.e., 3899/2010). The latter significantly reduces the scope of the arbitration 
procedure at the expense of employees, whilst Law 4093/2012 makes the whole 
procedure simpler and faster for the benefit of the employer. In particular, only 
issues related to salaries and remuneration per hour can now be included within 
the remit of the arbitration process, whereas other terms and conditions (e.g., 
bonuses, compensation rates, and other benefits) that were typically part of this 
process are now excluded (INE/GSEE-ADEDY, 2010: 299-300).
Collective Redundancies and Job Losses
New employment legislation allows greater flexibility in favour of the employ-
ers with regard to redundancies and compensation rates by changing the rules 
of collective dismissals (c.f. Kretsos, 2011b). More specifically, the compensation 
rate has been reduced up to 50% as soon as the employer gives advanced notice. 
Henceforth, according to the recent labour law reform, the period of notice is: 
1- one month for those that are employed from two months to 10 years; 2- two 
months for those that are employed at least 10 years; 3- three months for those 
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that are employed at least 15 years; 4- four months for those that are employed 
at least 20 years; and 5- six months for those that are employed more than 20 
years (Kokkaliari, 2010b: 4). In addition, according to the new employment law, 
organizations with at least 150 employees can dismiss up to 5% of the workforce 
and no more than 30 employees, whereas before the enactment of the legisla-
tion the corresponding quota was 2% (maximum limit) (Kokkaliari, 2010b). 
rethinking Greek capitalism
Greece currently is moving between two major groups of institutional drivers 
through which its capitalistic system can be understood. The first group is related 
to the traditional institutional logics of the system, namely the underground 
economy (Katsios, 2006); the predominance of SMEs (Mulhern, 1995;Kritsantonis, 
1998; Psychogios and Wood, 2010) that mainly operate on a national rather than 
international level (Kornelakis and Voskeristian, 2014); the adoption of informal 
management and organizational practices (Psychogios and Szamosi, 2007), and 
the poor capabilities of the state (Psychogios et al., 2008). The second group 
is related to the imposed institutional changes, attempting to respond to the 
crisis and make the system more liberalized (Kyrgidou and Spyropoulou, 2013; 
Koukiadaki and Kretsos, 2012). These two seem to have created a context of 
institutional complexity that can decouple action from structure in terms of 
adopting more liberalized IR practices. For example, changes in the IR system have 
been targeted at liberalizing Greek capitalism. These changes can be understood 
in the following phases.
In the initial phase (May 2010 to December 2010) of IR reform, changes in the 
individual labour law and the collective bargaining process were introduced. In 
the second (December 2010-October 2011), further legislation was introduced 
(Law 3899/2010) that established the mediation and arbitration process of 
collective bargaining (Voskeritsian and Kornelakis 2011). From October 2011 to 
June 2012, collective bargaining had been further decentralized reaching the 
level of companies and industries (Law 4024/2011); this triggered more social and 
political resistance (European Commission, 2014). From June 2012 until December 
2014 there was another change in the IR system. During this period, the second 
memorandum was ratified and more legislation emerged targeting to liberalize 
the IR system (Law 4046/2012; 4152/2012). This phase was characterized by a 
stabilization of the system which the European Commission (2014) indicated that 
substantive implementation had occurred, goals were generally being met, and 
wages were in better alignment with productivity and costs; however, phase four 
came to a dramatic ‘halt’ with the January 2015 election of a left government 
and the introduction of dramatic turbulence back into the system (Financial 
Times, 2015)—termed Phase Five. It brought in legislation that sought to halt 
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austerity (Bird, 2015). It can be argued that these waves of reforms had the 
consequences of weakening the position of those firms most closely engaged with 
formal institutional arrangements, leaving the large informal sector, the offshore 
activities of the “unpatriotic” capitalist elite (periodic promises of tax crackdowns 
notwithstanding) and the machinations of the militarists largely unscathed. The 
Greek system cannot, however, be dismissed as dysfunctional: clearly, it continues 
to work quite well for certain economic interests, even if the reforms have left 
most workers worse off, and enhanced occupational and job insecurity. 
Although it has often been argued that neo-liberal interests welcome such 
periods of “creative destruction” in that they open the opportunity for the 
permanent destruction of structures that might mediate markets and facilitate 
the capture of resources by a new entrepreneurial class (invariably oligarchs) 
(Klein, 2007), such processes can, in some circumstances, leave existing elites 
completely discredited, and open opportunities for new political actors or move-
ments. Whilst the latter are not invariably progressive, there is a growing number 
of examples (mostly in Latin America), where reckless liberalization has led to 
the ascendency of the radical left. At the time of writing, it is unclear whether 
the current Left Government will be able to realize its agenda, and, in any event, 
there seems little sign of a speedy resolution to Greece’s structural challenges.
Hence, whilst it has widely been argued that all countries are to a lesser or 
greater extent liberalizing (Streeck, 2011), Greece is being pulled in two dis-
tinct directions, reflecting both the durable strength of key interest groupings 
who have little interest in better institutions and external pressures to liberaliza-
tion on the one hand, and political counter-movements on the other hand. Al-
though the military elite should bear a significant proportion of the blame for the 
Greek crisis, they continue to commandeer a disproportionate amount of state 
resources, whilst corruption surrounding defence spending does little to promote 
transparency elsewhere across the economy. Meanwhile, the capitalist elite are 
distinguished by their tendency to evade fiscal responsibility, again, a long legacy 
of a weak and at times, repressive, state tradition (Close, 2014); nowhere is this 
better evidenced than the Greek-owned merchant marine, one of the largest in 
the world, but largely flagged abroad in regulatory and tax havens. In turn, this 
makes it very difficult for even a progressive Greek government to promote social 
compromise, and to promote greater responsibility and engagement with the 
system among smaller economic players. Hence, liberalization has done little to 
erode systemic dualism, other than further weakening the position of those firms 
more closely engaged with, and who have built their competitiveness on, existing 
institutional arrangements. 
But, how can the Greek system work better? Kornelakis and Voskeristian 
(2014) suggest that if the imposed institutional changes do not take account 
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of the traditional institutional logics, they will fail: the whole effort of deregu-
lating the IR system, intended to make the Greek business environment more 
attractive for foreign direct investments, will be of limited to no importance. 
In other words, there needs to be  more thought as to what was the basis of 
competitiveness of those Greek and foreign firms that benefitted from existing 
institutional arrangements, and who provided “good” jobs for their workers, 
and how this can be preserved during a period of reform. Yet, it can be argued 
that a limitation of institutional theories is a tendency to focus on the gap 
between the present and the desirable, with only limited attention being ac-
corded to how they may be bridged. Greece may be impelled in one direction 
by a progressive movement from below, but it is driven in another by external 
pressures, and, at home, by militarists and “unpatriotic” elites, who have little 
interest in stronger regulation, and who may well be served by weaker govern-
mental capabilities.
conclusion
In theoretical terms, this paper highlights the need to take account of the 
composition of elites in understanding both institutional path dependence and 
change, and the uneven and partial nature of what constitutes institutional func-
tionality: systems that may appear in many respects dysfunctional may work rath-
er well for specific economic interests. Indeed, it can be argued that institutional 
arrangements invariably incorporate some or other functionalities for particular 
sets of actors, or they would not emerge or persist at all. Although Greece has 
much in common with other MMEs, and indeed surrounding Balkan states, what 
sets Greece apart (with the possible exceptions of Serbia and Kosovo) is the dis-
proportionate funnelling of state resources to the military, not only making for a 
genuine sovereign wealth crisis (as adverse to a bank inflicted one), but also less 
state spending in other areas, a crowding out of investment, as well as additional 
opportunities for corruption. In turn, this has reinforced the dualism in the econ-
omy. Whilst there has been a tendency to view states as retreating in the face of 
markets, in Greece the situation is more complicated. For example, Greek gov-
ernments have persistently committed to excessive defence spending that has 
consistently outstripped resource capabilities, worsened by Western European 
governments who encouraged their banks to extend easy credit to the Greek 
state to bolster up their arms exports. Although with the latest agreement this 
has been addressed somewhat (Wall Street Journal, 2015) it is still disproportion-
ate. This is a further example of why the Greek case is a unique one that cannot 
be easily categorized as a ‘dysfunctional’ liberal market economy (Della Sala, 
2008; Kornelakis and Voskeristian, 2014) or MME (Amable, 2003) that is charac-
terized by an inevitable retreat from statism.
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There is little doubt that present Greek institutions are both weak and dys-
functional in terms of regulating labour markets, and, indeed, for securing viable 
and sustainable growth, even if they continue to work quite well in meeting the 
interests of both militarists and “unpatriotic” economic elite; indeed, reduced 
governmental capabilities make it inevitably more difficult to hold the latter to 
account. A long period of institutional drift caused by this type of capitalism, as 
local dominant elites battle to amend the system in order to cope with long term 
shifts in the capitalist economy, may result in such elites narrowing their focus on 
to their own immediate concerns which can easily be accommodated through 
liberalization of large areas of the economy, a process that Jessop (2011) argues 
is characteristic of the global neo-liberal ecosystem. In short, smaller and more 
marginal players may both be pushed further out of the system (either through 
benign neglect or systematic exclusion) and actively choose to withdraw. This 
vests the organized labour and other civil society associations with great his-
toric importance. In the absence of coherent policy alternatives, the role of trade 
unions is likely to remain defensive, mounting desperate rear-guard actions in 
order to shore up a decaying existing order. Whilst this vests national politics with 
great importance, it is as yet unclear if the current (2015) Greek government will 
be able to ameliorate external pressures and solve the problem of Greece’s elite.
Notes
1 This study follows the definition of SMEs adopted by the European Commission (2003/361/
EC). In particular, it distinguishes Medium-sized companies (<250 Employees and 50m 
Turnover), Small companies (<50 Employees and 10m Turnover) and Micro companies (<10 
Employees and 2m Turnover). 
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summary
rethinking Greek Capitalism through the Lens of Industrial 
relations reform: A View until the 2015 referendum
Although the literature on comparative capitalism has been expanded to 
encompass the Mixed Market Economies (MMEs) of the Mediterranean world 
and other less mature institutional arrangements, it can be argued that more 
attention needs to be accorded to internal diversity within capitalist archetypes 
and the nature and path of change. In focusing on the latter, this paper explores 
changes in Industrial relations (Ir) regulation and practice in Greece which, since 
the onset of the economic crisis, has shifted towards lighter regulation; however, 
liberalization has not meant convergence with the mature Liberal Market 
Economy (LME) model and its presumed associated complementarities. Based on 
current developments and advances in the literature on comparative capitalism, 
this study explores the process and dynamics of institutional change, and the 
long continuities that set Greece apart from both ‘disorganized’ LMEs and other 
MMEs. This encompasses issues such as the composition of elites, the nature of 
institutional path dependence and change, and the uneven and partial nature of 
what constitutes institutional functionality. Whilst the Greek system is commonly 
condemned as dysfunctional, it satisfies specific economic interests. Being impelled 
in one direction by a progressive movement from below, it is driven in another by 
external pressures, and, at home, by “unpatriotic” elites, who have little interest in 
stronger regulation, and may well be served by weaker governmental capabilities. 
As local economic elites seek to reposition themselves within the system in order to 
cope with shifts in the capitalist economy, it may result in them further narrowing 
their focus onto their own immediate concerns accommodated through economic 
liberalization. Smaller, marginal, players may be pushed further out of the system 
and/or actively choose to withdraw, the attempts of the present government to 
ameliorate the shocks of liberalization notwithstanding. This vests the organized 
labour and other civil society associations with great historic importance.
KEyWOrDS: Greek capitalism, varieties of capitalism, capitalist diversity, austerity, 
institutional change, elite theory.
résumé 
repenser le capitalisme grec à travers le prisme de la réforme 
des relations industrielles : regard sur l’après-référendum  
de 2015
Bien que la littérature sur le capitalisme comparé ait élargi son champ d’étude 
aux économies de marché mixtes (EMM) du monde méditerranéen et à d’autres 
arrangements institutionnels moins évolués, il serait important de se pencher 
plus attentivement sur la diversité interne des archétypes capitalistes ainsi que 
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sur la nature et la trajectoire du changement. À cette fin, l’article examine les 
changements survenus sur les plans de la régulation et de la pratique des 
relations industrielles en Grèce, un pays qui a allégé sa régulation depuis le 
début de la crise économique. Cependant, la libéralisation ne s’est pas traduite 
par une convergence vers le modèle de libre marché et vers les présumées 
complémentarités qui y sont associées. À la lumière de l’évolution et des progrès 
de la littérature sur le capitalisme comparé, les auteurs analysent le processus et 
la dynamique du changement institutionnel ainsi que les longues continuités qui 
distinguent la Grèce des économies de marché libérales et autres économies de 
marché mixtes « désorganisées ». Leur regard s’attarde à différents enjeux comme 
la composition des élites, la nature de la dépendance institutionnelle au sentier 
et au changement, ainsi qu’au caractère inégal et partiel de ce qui constitue la 
fonctionnalité institutionnelle. Bien qu’il soit généralement jugé dysfonctionnel, 
le régime grec satisfait néanmoins des intérêts économiques particuliers. Tiré de 
l’avant par un mouvement progressiste issu de la base, il est en même temps poussé 
dans une direction opposée par des pressions extérieures et, sur place, par des élites 
« dépourvues de fibre patriotique », peu intéressées par un renforcement de la 
régulation et, parfois, mieux servies par un gouvernement aux capacités réduites. 
Au moment où les élites économiques locales cherchent à se repositionner dans le 
système pour s’adapter à une économie capitaliste en transformation, ces dernières 
pourraient être enclines à centrer davantage leurs efforts sur leurs propres intérêts 
immédiats, intérêts qui se trouvent confortés par une libéralisation économique. 
Certains joueurs plus modestes et marginaux pourraient être exclus du système 
ou décider eux-mêmes de s’en retirer, sans égard aux mesures prises par l’actuel 
gouvernement pour tenter d’amortir les chocs provoqués par la libéralisation. Une 
telle situation conférerait aux syndicats et à aux autres organisations de la société 
civile une importance historique considérable.
MOTS-CLÉS: capitalisme grec, variétés du capitalisme, diversité des capitalismes, aus-
térité, changement institutionnel, théorie des élites.
resumen
repensar el capitalismo griego a través los lentes  
de la reforma de las relaciones industriales:  
una visión hasta el referéndum 2015
Aunque la literatura sobre el capitalismo comparativo se ha extendido para incluir 
las economías de mercado mixto (EMM) del mundo Mediterráneo y otros acuerdos 
institucionales menos maduros, se puede argumentar la importancia de prestar 
mayor atención a la diversidad interna dentro de los arquetipos capitalistas y a la 
naturaleza y las configuraciones de cambio. Centrándose en este último, el artículo 
explora los cambios en la regulación y la práctica de las relaciones industriales en 
Grecia, los cuales, desde el comienzo de la crisis económica, se han tornado hacia 
una reglamentación más ligera; sin embargo, la liberalización no ha significado 
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convergencia con el modelo de economía liberal de mercado (ELM) y sus presu-
midas complementariedades asociadas. Basado en los desarrollos en curso y en 
los avances de la literatura sobre el capitalismo comparativo, este estudio explora 
el proceso y las dinámicas de los cambios institucionales y las vastas continuida-
des que sitúan la Grecia aparte de ambos modelos, el “desorganizado” ELM y las 
otras EMM. Esto hace resaltar otros problemas como la composición de las élites, 
la naturaleza de la trayectoria institucional de dependencia y cambio, y la natu-
raleza inconsistente y parcial de lo que constituye su funcionalidad institucional. 
A pesar que el sistema griego es comúnmente condenado como disfuncional, él 
satisface ciertos intereses específicos. Siendo impulsado hacia una dirección por 
un movimiento progresivo desde la base, él es conducido hacia otra dirección por 
las presiones externas y, al interior, por las elites “antipatriotas”, que tienen poco 
interés por una regulación fuerte y que podrían beneficiar de las capacidades gu-
bernamentales debilitadas. Como las elites económicas locales buscan a reposicio-
narse en el sistema de manera a adaptarse a los cambios en la economía capitalis-
ta, esto puede dar lugar a una mayor focalización en sus propias preocupaciones 
inmediatas con miras a acomodarse mediante la liberalización económica. Otros 
actores más pequeños y marginales pueden ser empujados a alejarse del sistema 
y/o escoger activamente de retirarse, a pesar de los intentos del gobierno actual 
para mejorar las conmociones de la liberalización. Esto procura una gran impor-
tancia histórica a las organizaciones laborales y a las otras asociaciones civiles de 
la sociedad.
PALABrAS CLAVES: capitalismo griego, variedades de capitalismo, diversidad capita-
lista, austeridad, cambio institucional, teoría de elites.
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